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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/04/2006 Accident number: 61 
Accident time: 11:30 Accident Date: 28/11/1996 
Where it occurred: Libongo, Caxito, 
Bengo Province 
Country: Angola 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: 12/12/1996 
ID original source: NO/PH/JJ/TF Name of source: Other/UCAM 
Organisation: [Name removed]  





Date record created: 23/01/2004 Date  last modified: 23/01/2004 
No of victims: 2 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: Barro Do Dande Map series:  
Map edition: Map SC33/B1 Map sheet: 71 
Map name: 1:100 000  
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate equipment (?) 
safety distances ignored (?) 
pressure to work quickly (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 




The demining group worked in three-man teams with one deminer detecting, one cutting 
undergrowth and excavating, and one resting at any one time. 
No copy of the Board of Inquiry report was found on file at the country MAC. A copy was 
obtained by other means and the following summarises its content.  
The investigators were unable to approach the accident site when they visited on 2nd 
December 1996. They returned on 5th December when the area had been re-cleared. Their 
report stated that the demining group were working on two sites, with 18 men at one site and 
seven men working at the other. Both came under an expatriate supervisor who was at the 
larger site 18k away). The track being cleared ran along the side of "an old railway 
embankment". It was described as "distinct" but "overgrown with sparse vegetation". [A 
photograph showed stubs of coarse grass in the path and long grass and light bush around 
it.] The ground was quite hard and "stony" with "a lot of metal fragments". 
The Section worked as two teams of three deminers and a "commander". The section had 
been on site for two days and had "cleared approximately 60 meters", finding three MAI-75s. 
Each team cleared a metre wide lane along the track, with one team ahead of the other. The 
accident occurred at about 11:30 after the order for personnel in the teams to change around 
was given. The two deminers who had been resting moved forward to take over. As they 
walked "down the track one of the men…stood on a mine in a cleared area". The victim had a 
traumatic amputation of a foot and his colleague received light fragmentation injuries. Neither 
victim was wearing safety equipment because they had yet to take it from their working 
colleagues. 
The investigators found that the cleared lane varied in width (averaging 3m). About two 
metres from the blast crater was another MAI-75 mine that had been located at a depth of 
one or two centimetres. The EOD specialist present advised that the mine involved in the 
accident may have been buried deeper – possibly up to 7-8cm – but this "could not be 
accepted conclusively without conducting trails with other mines". Fragments of a MAI-75 
were found.  
The board found that the Schiebel detector was not affected by the type of soil present and 
that a MAI-75 could "be detected at a distance of 10cm from the underside of the 
Schiebel…to the top of the mine".  Finally the board made a random search of the cleared 
area and found that although there was evidence of investigation around all metallic readings, 
the metal fragments had not been removed. The deminers interviewed all believed that the 
mine had been deeply buried, which was why it was missed. 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that the mine had not been buried very deeply. The team was 
clearing at an average rate of "at least 6 square metres per hour" per three man team, from 
which the investigation inferred that either the teams was working too quickly or it was 
missing out "drills". They believed that the failure to use "base sticks" "may have been a 
contributing factor to this accident". The "level and experience" of the Angolan team 
Commanders was questioned and the demining group's failure to use any means of marking 
cleared areas as they worked "could quite easily lead to unchecked areas".  Concern about 
working distances, lane widths and the practice of leaving metal in the ground were 
expressed. The investigators decided that medical procedures were good. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that the demining platoon should stop working until they had 
undergone an "extended period of retraining". They also recommended that the group change 
to a one-man drill. They said that the demining group should review the practice of placing 




Victim number: 83 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: None Protection used: none 
 
Summary of injuries: 
AMPUTATION/LOSS 
Leg Below knee 
COMMENT 
No medical report was made available. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 84 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: presumed 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: None Protection used: none 
 







No medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the 
demining field operation was carried out in a way that led to mines being missed.  
There were also management failings because the systems they had devised allowed the 
exchange of shared protective equipment to take place inside the working area, mined area 
marking to be inadequate and for supervisors to lack appropriate experience or training. The 
secondary cause is listed as a “Management/control inadequacy”. 
3 
The development NGO demining group involved in this accident is no longer working in 
humanitarian demining in Angola – their withdrawal was reported to be as a direct 
consequence of its two accidents in late 1996.   
 
Related papers 
A document (in Portuguese) and signed by a senior UN Technical Advisor was at file at the 
UN MAC. It stated that there were three casualties in this accident but gave no additional 
detail.  
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